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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

v.

Plaintiff-Respondent,

LEON MARLOWE KENT,

Case No.
10713

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Leon Marlowe Kent, was convicted of the crime of unlawful possession of narcotic drugs.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with unlawful possession of narcotic drugs. Prior to trial a motion to
suppress certain evidence was made on the basis
of an allegedly illegal search and seizure. The trial
court denied the motion to suppress. On a trial before the court sitting without a jury, appellant was
found guilty of the charge of unlawful possession
of narcotics.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
.Respondent submits that the conviction and the
dernal of appellant s motion to suppress certain evidence should be affirmed.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent submits the following statement of
facts. The allegedly illegal search and seizure
occurred as follows:

In pursuit of an investigation (R. 25), Officer H.
W. Patrick, of the Salt Lake City Police Department
proceeded to the Tower Motel, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for the purpose of undertaking a surveillance of ths
activities of the appellant (R. 25). Officer Patrick con·
tacted the manager of the Tower Motel and asked
for an adjoining unit so that "We could probably se8
associates coming and going to their residence"
(R. 25). The manager informed Officer Patrick thal
the only feasible adjoining unit was occupied, "Bui
that she [the manager J had an area that she fell
would be adequate in providing the purpose tha: '
we needed. She took me to an overhead area, which
is where all the heating and air conditioning ducts,
all the wires and the access to the boiler room was,
above the unit area. It encompasses the whole upstairs story of the unit or of the motel" (R. 25). From
this area, the officer had access to an open vent to
the bathroom of appellant's unit from which it was
felt that visual and verbal observations could be
made (R. 26). The vent was of such a nature thal a
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person standing in the bathroom of the appellant's
motel unit could look up and see someone looking
down the vent (R. 27):
On the third day of observation, Officer Patrick
observed appellant enter the bathroom and prepare
to "shoot up" (R. 33). Officer Patrick radioed to his
companion on the street and the arrest was effectuated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ACTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS BY THE
POLICE OFFICERS DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SEARCH
AND SEIZURE WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
SENSE.
A. NO EVIDENCE AGAINST THE APPELLANT
WAS OBTAINED BY MEANS OF A TRESPASS
OR UNLAWFUL ENTRY.

The record is unequivocable that Officer Patrick
approached the manager of the Tower Motel for the
purpose of obtaining a unit adjacent to appellant's
unit for the purpose of surveillance. The manager
informed the officer that there was not an available
unit but suggested and escorted the officer to an
area overhead of the appellant's unit (R. 25). Appellant has not nor does he now claim a right or interest
in the overhead area to which the officer was escorted.

It is submitted that there must be a physical in-

trusion into an area over which one has dominion
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and control before there is a search of that area by
another. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1940). In On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952)
the United States Supreme Court was asked to con:
sider a problem allegedly left unanswered in Gold·
man v. United States, supra. That problem was the
affect on a search and seizure question of a trespass.
The court stated at 753:
Only in the case of physical entry, either by force ...
by unwilling submission to authority ... or without
any express or implied consent ... would the problem
left undecided in the Goldman case be before the
court.

The Court then concluded that because there
had not been a physical entry so as to constitute a
trespass, the problem would remain unanswered.
In the instant case, it cannot be said that Officer
Patrick violated an area over which the appellant
exercised complete dominion and control. Rather,
the officer's physical presence was in an area suqgested and designated by the manager of the motel
and over which the manager had exclusive control
and dominion. Appellants cite Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964), and Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610 (1961), for the proposition that the consent of the owner of the motel was without effect
(R. 8). However, the Stoner case was involved with
an actual entry by the police officers into the petitioner's motel room and the Chapman case involved
a physical entry into the petitioner's rented hom;·
Here, there was no physical entry of appella~t s
room by the police officer. The area from which
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Officer Patrick made the assailed observations was
an ar8a over which the appellant could claim no
valid right or interest. No citation of authority is
necessary for the proposition that a land owner or
another vested with the complete control and dominion over an area may allow persons thereon and
that such presence is not subject to complaint by
one with no interest or right in the area.
Appellant's reference to Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), as being an analogous
case, is incorrect. In that case, the court was keenly
aware of the actual physical intrusion effected by
the police with the result that the petitioners entire
heating system was converted into a conductor of
sound. As stated at 509, " ... the eavesdropping was
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical
penetration into the premises occupied by the petitioners."
B. THE OBSERVATIONS BY THE POLICE
OFFICERS DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SEARCH.

From the area occupied by Officer Patrick, observation into the unit occupied by the appellant
was readily available (R. 27). The officer did not have
to take any affirmative action, such as removing a
cover from the vent (R. 27), but rather, merely observed that which was open to observation by anyone in the area which the officer occupied.
This court has recognized the principle that
mere observation of that which is readily open to
view does not constitute a search. In State v. Allred.
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16 Utah 2d 41, 44, 395 P.2d 535, 537 (1964), it was
stated:
No. search was n_ecessary for the officer to find these
articles, they bemg fully disclosed to his view when
he approached the car. Under such circumstances
where no search is required the constitutional guaran'.
tee is not applicable.

In Chapman v. United States, 346 F.2d 383, 387
(9th Cir. 1965), it was stated:
It is not a search for an officer to observe (once lawfully near or on and within premises) that which is
clearly and plainly to be seen, even if he uses search
lights or field glasses.

An officer of the peace does not have to ignore
that which his senses reveal. Burks v. United States,
287 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1961); Martin v. United States,
155 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1946). Officer Patrick did no
more than observe that which was open to observation by anyone occupying the area. It may also here
be noted that Officer Patrick testified that it would
be possible for someone in the bathroom of appellant's unit to readily ascertain that he was being observed through the vent (R. 27).
In State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.Zd 761 (19621,
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 835 (1963), the Supreme Court
of New Jersey considered a challenge that there was
an illegal search and seizure where police officers
observed the commission of a crime through a crack
in the door or the keyhole. The court stated, 37 NJ
at 495, 181 A.2d at 768:
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Here the officers saw the offense. That they saw it
through a crack in the door or the keyhole does not
affect the direct character of the knowledge gained
or the conclusion that the offense occurred in their
'presence' within the meaning of that word. Rather
it raises at best a different question, whether thus to
peer into private property through an aperture constitutes a search, with the result that the arrest depended upon the product of the search, rather than
the search upon the arrest.

769:

The court concluded, 37 N.J. at 496, 181 A.2d at
This leaves the fact that officers looked through an
opening to view what was going on within the apartment. Peering through a window or a crack in a door
or a keyhole is not, in the abstract, genteel behavior,
but the Fourth Amendment does not protect against
all conduct unworthy of a good neighbor. Even surveillance of a house to see who enters and leaves is
something less than good manners would permit. But
it is the duty of a policeman to investigate, and we
cannot say that in striking a balance between the
rights of the individual and the needs of law enforcement, the Fourth Amendment itself draws the blinds
the occupant could have drawn but did not. In the
absence of a physical entry into premises secured by
the amendment, there is no unreasonable search. In
such circumstances it has been held that the guaranteed right of privacy is not violated when a police
officer, by use of his senses, detects a criminal event
occurring in an area protected by the amendment.
[Emphasis added.]

Appellant's brief, page 7, states:
See also People v. Regalado, 36 Cal. Rptr. 795 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1964), wherein narcotics seized following an

8
?bservation made by an officer through a small hole
m a hotel room door were held inadmissible.

However, appellant's brief fails to clarify the
fact that the court was primarily concerned with the
knowledge of the arresting officers in two respects.
The court stated, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 797:
The only reason they [the officers] had for believincr
a crime was being committed what was Walsh sa;
when he peeked through the hole in the door.
The officers knew, from their familiarity with the
methods of the police in the district, that the hole
was one of many which the police had bored for use
in spying upon the inmates of rented rooms. The
holes were maintained for the use of any and all
officers while on spying missions.

In the instant case, Officer Patrick testified that
contact with the manager of the Tower Motel was '
effectuated in pursuit of an investigation (R. 25). It is
also conceded that Officer Patrick took no action
other than to observe that which was open to view.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the conviction of the appellant and the denial of appellant's motion to suppress
certain evidence should be affirmed on the ground
that there was no physical trespass or unlawful
entry into the premises occupied by the appellant.
Rather, the officer was merely observing that which
was open to view from an area suggested and w
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vealed to the officer by the person having complete
control and dominion over the area.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GARY A. FRANK
Asst. Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent

